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Abstract—In-memory computing (IMC) architectures provide
a much needed solution to energy-efficiency barriers posed by
Von-Neumann computing due to the movement of data between
the processor and the memory. The functions implemented
in such in-memory architectures are often proprietary and
constitute confidential Intellectual Property (IP). Our studies
indicate that IMC architectures implemented using Resistive
RAM (RRAM) are susceptible to Side Channel Attack (SCA).
Unlike the conventional SCAs that are aimed to leak private
keys from cryptographic implementations, SCARE (SCA on IMC
for reverse engineering) can reveal the sensitive IP implemented
within the memory. Therefore, the adversary does not need
to perform invasive Reverse Rngineering (RE) to unlock the
functionality. We demonstrate SCARE by taking recent IMC
architectures such as Dynamic Computing In Memory (DCIM)
and Memristor Aided Logic (MAGIC) as test cases. Simulation
results indicate that AND, OR, and NOR gates (which are the
building blocks of complex functions) yield distinct power and
timing signatures based on the number of inputs making them
vulnerable to SCA. Although process variations can obfuscate the
signatures due to significant overlap, we show that adversary can
use statistical modeling (using foundry-calibrated simulations or
fabricating known functions in test chips) and analysis to identify
the structure of the implemented function (e.g., x1x2 + x3).
Furthermore, SCARE can find the implemented IP by testing
limited number of patterns. For example, the proposed technique
reduces the number of patterns by 64% compared to a brute
force attack for a + bc function. Additionally, analysis shows
improvement in SCAREs detection model due to adversarial
change in supply voltage for both DCIM and MAGIC. We
also propose countermeasures such as redundant inputs and
expansion of literals. Redundant inputs can mask the IP with
25% area and 20% power overhead. However, functions can be
found by greater RE effort. Expansion of literals incurs 36%
power overhead. However, it imposes brute force search by the
adversary for which the RE effort increases by 3.04X.
Index Terms—In-Memory Computing, Side Channel Attack,
RRAM, Intellectual Property, Reverse Engineering.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Von-Neuman architecture, transistor scaling has improved
memory and processing units asymmetrically, leading to gaps
in performance/energy consumption. Faster processing units
need frequent and energy-intensive data-transfers from slower
memory, which imposes leads to a degradation in overall
system performance. Processing data within the memory will
avoid Von-Neumann bottleneck and improves system perfor-
mance and power consumption.
In-Memory Computing (IMC) is a promising compute
model to minimize the data transfer between processor and
memory by confining data within compute-capable memory.
Several works have been proposed to move compute logic
closer to the main memory or infuse the processing ability into
memory cells [1]–[6]. IMC can perform specific tasks such as
dot-products that are used for recognition [3] and search [7],
or support a wide range of logic [8] and arithmetic operations
(e.g. matrix multiplication [9]). The compute capability of
conventional memories such as Static RAM (SRAM) and
Dynamic RAM (DRAM) have been heavily studied [10],
[11], [12]. IMC is also achievable by using emerging Non-
Volatile Memories (NVMs) e.g., Resistive RAM (RRAM),
Spin Transfer Torque (STT) Magnetic RAM, Phase Change
Memory, etc. RRAM based IMC architectures in particular,
has exhibited significant promise due to low power consump-
tion, fast operation, and high integration density (4F 2 footprint
in crossbar architecture [13]). RRAM provides higher sense-
margin and many analog states compared to other NVMs
e.g., STTRAM. Although RRAM may not be preferred for
storage applications due to poor write endurance, it is useful
for IMC since write-operation is only needed once (to program
the function). Furthermore, unlike read operation of RRAM,
IMC does not require constant DC current, which leads to
higher endurance. In this paper, we propose SCARE (SCA
on IMC for reverse engineering) taking RRAM based IMC
architectures as test cases which can reveal IMC Intellectual
Property (IP).
Existing IMC architectures such as, Dynamic Computing
In Memory (DCIM) [2], Memristor Aided Logic (MAGIC)
[14], material implication (IMPLY) [15], etc. are only capable
of implementing functions with limited number of inputs.
Implementing large functions using DCIM reduces Sense
Margin (SM) [2]. For MAGIC and IMPLY, the delay/power
consumption increases exponentially with function size. An
adversary can leverage power/current signature by Side Chan-
nel Attack (SCA) to Reverse Engineer (RE) the implemented
function i.e., the number of minterms and the number of input
literals per minterm. The final goal of the adversary is to find
the function implemented in IMC (example is shown in Fig.
1).
Example of SCARE attack: A simplified example of the
SCARE attack is shown in Fig. 1. It considers that the
IMC operation is carried out in two cycles to compute a
function in the Sum-of-Product (SOP) form. The first cycle
computes the AND and the second cycle computes the OR
[2]. In this example, SCARE involves the following steps:
(1) extraction of current profile during the compute cycles;
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Fig. 1: Example of SCA to extract the structure of imple-
mented function in IMC.
(2) matching the 2nd cycle current profile with one of the
pre-calculated current-profile models to determine the number
of minterms implemented within the OR array. Here, the
minterms represent the fanin of the OR gate; (3) matching
the 1st cycle current profile with one of the pre-calculated
current-profile models to determine the number of literals in
the AND array i.e., the fanin of the AND gates. Knowing the
number of minterms from the 2nd cycle allows the adversary
to determine the number of input literals per SOP minterm; (4)
after finding the function structure, extracting the implemented
function by applying a limited number of patterns to the chip
and validating using a golden chip.
Baseline attack model: We have assumed that adversary
can obtain the pre-computed current profile models developed
through foundry-calibrated simulations or by fabricating small
known functions in a test chip (more details in Section II-D)
to aid in the RE process. For the sake of brevity, this paper fo-
cuses on two RRAM based IMC architectures, namely DCIM
[2] and MAGIC [14] to demonstrate SCARE. However, the
attack can also be implemented on other emerging IMC with
minor changes. Note that process variation can lead to a
large variation in power/timing profile of implemented gates.
This, in turn, can make RE challenging due to the overlap
of signatures from two different gates (e.g., 2-input AND
gate power can overlap with 3-input AND due to variations).
However, adversary can use statistical analysis of power/delay
to filter the correct function (details in Section III and IV).
IMC can improve power-efficiency by cutting down sensor
data movement in IoT/mobile devices whereas in servers,
it can improve performance and reduce cooling costs by
lowering power dissipation. Our attack model is suited for
IoT/mobile where the users/adversaries will have access to
the devices/power port.
Distinctions from memory SCA: SCAs on traditional
memories have been studied in the past. Side channel leak-
age of ASIC components is investigated in [16]. It shows
that SRAMs have geometrically uniform structures and their
leakage closely follows a generic hamming distance. The
observation is based on SRAM write operation that flips the
data stored in the memory cell. The data dependent write
current can be leveraged to launch simple power analysis
attacks. Emerging memories provide better scope of SCA
due to higher write and read currents compared to SRAM.
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on STTRAM have been
investigated in [17] to decode the memory contents. Note
that the write current based SCA will not work for all IMC
architectures due to the absence of write operation (e.g.,
DCIM) during computing. Furthermore, IMC computing is
different than the read operation due to the absence of static
current during computing. Therefore, read current based SCA
is not directly applicable to IMC. Furthermore, the objective
of SCA based RE is to extract the implemented function in
contrast to SCA based key extraction which only identifies the
hamming weight of the data.
Distinctions from conventional RE: RE is generally an
invasive and destructive form of analyzing integrated circuits
(IC) where an adversary grinds away each layer of an IC and
captures optical images. The base layer provides gate types
and upper layers provide their connectivity. By combining the
information, the IP could be unlocked. In contrast, SCARE
is a non-invasive RE approach that exploits SCA to extract IP
implemented in emerging IMC. This eliminates the need for
highly expensive and invasive forms of RE for emerging IMC
based computing. With SCARE, the extracted structure reveals
the number of input literals and the number of SOP minterms.
In essence, the structure reveals the number and input-type
of each of the AND and OR gates present in the function.
This extracted structure can be further used to design a limited
number of input patterns to determine the overall SOP function
(not covered in this paper). Based on our literature survey,
SCARE is the first work on RE of IMC based IP.
In particular, we make the following contributions in this
paper. We,
(a) investigate SCA on IMC architectures for non-invasive RE
of IP;
(b) exploit side channel current profiles to identify the gate
structures of the implemented functions;
(c) propose two attack models for DCIM and MAGIC, re-
spectively. One works for true inputs only and other one
works for both, true and complementary inputs;
(d) conduct PV analysis of the IMC architectures to develop
an SCA comparison model;
(e) propose countermeasures such as, redundant inputs and
expansion of literals to protect from SCARE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II introduces the basics of RRAM, DCIM, and MAGIC
IMC architectures, background on SCA and simulation setup;
Sections III and IV describe the proposed attack models
on DCIM and MAGIC, respectively and the results; Section
V presents countermeasures; Section VI presents discussion;
Finally, Section VII draws the conclusions.
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Fig. 2: (a) Implementation of AB+CD using DCIM [2] in RRAM crossbar; and, (b) timing diagram of function implementation.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Basics of RRAM
RRAM is a two terminal device, which resistive switching
layer is sandwiched between two electrodes. Switching from
Low Resistance State (LRS) to High Resistance State (HRS) is
called ‘reset’ process and switching from HRS to LRS is called
‘set’ process. The resistance of the insulator layer changes
from LRS (HRS) to HRS (LRS) depending on the voltage
polarity between the two terminals [18].
B. Basics of IMC
1) DCIM: We have implemented the DCIM architecture
proposed in [2]. Fig. 2a shows the implementation of AB +
CD as an example and Fig. 2b shows the corresponding
timing waveforms. Each memory cell consists of an RRAM
connected in series with a selector diode. Functions are imple-
mented in SOP form using pre-programmed memory arrays.
Separate arrays for AND and OR operations are needed to
implement the logical functions. Inputs are given to the arrays
through Wordlines (WL). Final Bitline (BL) voltages are
considered as outputs (AND array BLs implement minterms
e.g., AB and CD, and, OR array BLs implement functions).
Any LRS RRAM in AND array’s BLs is considered as a
literal to the respective BL and any LRS RRAM in OR array’s
BLs serves as a minterm for the implemented function.
Initially, AND array’s BLs are pre-charged to VDD by
asserting PreAND. Then, inputs are applied to the RRAMs
by activating ENAND signal. If one of the literals of AND
array’s BLs is ‘0’, the respective BL gets discharged and
its voltage drops below the Sense Amplifier (SA) reference
voltage (VRef−AND) and the minterm is considered as ‘0’.
If all the inputs are logically ‘1’, the BL holds its pre-
charged value which is higher than the reference voltage and
is considered as ‘1’.
The BLs of OR array are initially pre-discharged to 0v.
After activating OREN signal if one of the input literals in a
BL is logically ‘1’ it can charge up the BL to a value higher
than OR array’s reference voltage (VRef−OR). Finally, the
voltage of OR array’s BLs are compared against VRef−OR at
the edge of SEOR and output is generated.
2) MAGIC: We have also implemented MAGIC architec-
ture proposed in [14] that employs memristors (RRAM in this
paper) to implement logic gates. A number of memristors
serve as inputs with previously stored data while an addi-
tional memristor acts as the output. Gates including MAGIC-
NOR, AND, OR, and NAND are shown in Fig. 3 (a)-
(d), respectively. MAGIC’s logical state is represented as a
resistance, where the HRS and LRS represent logical ‘0’
and ‘1’ respectively. Fig. 3 (e) shows the implementation of
AB + CD as an example. It consists of two 2-fanin AND
gates and one 2-fanin OR gate. Here, the input RRAMs, A,B,
and D, are initialized to logical ‘1’ (LRS) and RRAM C
is initialized to logical ‘0’ (HRS). All output RRAMs are
initialized to ‘0’ (HRS). In the first cycle, AB is computed by
asserting its bitline driver (BLAB) using the enable (ENAB)
signal. Since AB = 1, AB’s output RRAM switches from
‘0’ (HRS) → ‘1’ (LRS). Similarly, during the second cycle,
when BLCD is asserted using the ENCD signal, CD’s output
RRAM remains at ‘0’ (HRS). During the final cycle, the bitline
driver for the OR2 operation (BLAB+CD) is asserted using
the ENAB+CD signal. Fig. 3 (e) shows that the final output
RRAM switches from ‘0’→‘1’ and reflects the correct output
of AB + CD = 1.1 + 0.1 = 1.
C. Background on Side Channel Attack
SCA [16] is a powerful threat which targets weak implemen-
tation of systems on the chips. SCA exploits the unintentional
signature observed in physical channels like timing [19], power
consumption [16] and electromagnetic emanation [20] etc.
with an objective to recover the sensitive data being processed
e.g., cryptographic keys. Since different data bits exhibit differ-
ent physical signatures (power consumption, delay), SCA can
unveil the data. SCA on memory components targets hamming
distance which is equal to the number of bit transitions. Then,
a statistical dependency is tested between the hypothetical
leakage computed (using simulations, test chips, and leakage
models) and the measured leakage to guess the stored data.
D. Adversarial Modeling of IMC Power/Timing
In order to correlate the IMC power/timing (extracted using
SCA) with the appropriate gate type and fanin value, the
(e)
Fig. 3: Implementation of MAGIC gates, (a) NOR; (b) OR;
(c) NAND; and, (d) AND.
TABLE I: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
MOSFET Gate Length 65 nm
NMOS/PMOS Threshold Voltage 423/-365 mV
BL Capacitance 100 fF
RRAM Gap Min/Max/Oxide Thickness 0.1/1.7/5 nm
Atomic Energy: Vacancy Generation/Recombination 1.501/1.5 eV
RRAM Write Latency 25 ns
RRAM HRS/LRS at 1.2V 6.7M/58.9K Ω
adversary requires a pre-calculated power and timing model.
This model may be easily developed if the adversary has
access to the foundry calibrated device models. If not, the
adversary can order a limited number of test chips that
implement multiple small known functions using IMC. Such
opportunity is available through shuttle programs of vendors
like CMP and MOSIS. The adversary can then proceed to
develop a model based on the power and timing distributions
calculated for different gates and input sizes.
E. Simulation Setup
Simulations are performed in HSPICE with 65nm PTM
technology [21], ASU RRAM model [22] and bi-directional
selector diode model [23]. Detailed parameters of the devices
employed for simulations are shown in Table I. The test chips
obtained by the adversary with the known functions/gates are
subject to process variations. Therefore, the adversary will
only have a distribution of power profiles and operation times.
In order to represent this situation, we introduce process vari-
ations to the SCARE power profile/operation-time modeling
by performing Monte Carlo simulations with the parameters
listed in Table II.
TABLE II: Monte Carlo simulation parameters
Parameter Real Value Variation STD. Deviation
RRAM LRS Gap 0.1 nm 7% 3σ
RRAM HRS Gap 1.7 nm 7% 3σ
MOS Oxide Thickness 1.2 nm 10% 3σ
MOS Gate Length 65nm 10% 3σ
III. ATTACK ON DCIM ARCHITECTURE
Adversary can distinguish power drawn by OR and AND
arrays of DCIM by looking at their power signature. The
AND array is pre-charged by a PMOS transistor during pre-
charge phase, therefore, its power signature is negative (power
is drawn from voltage supply). The OR array is pre-discharged
by an NMOS transistor during pre-discharge phase, therefore,
the power is signature is positive (power is dissipated by the
ground node).
A. Attack Model 1
1) Leveraging the power drawn by OR and AND array:
In DCIM, computations are performed in two cycles between
EN signal and SE signal (ENAND and SEAND, and,
ENOR and SEOR) activation. SCARE especially considers
the peaks in the power profile for three reasons: (a) EN signal
activates large buffers (that are upsized to charge/discharge
the BLs); (b) SE signal activates SAs (significant capacitive
component); (c) short circuit current from VDD to ground
through buffers/SAs (when both pull up/down networks are
on).
Initially, the adversary chooses two consecutive time periods
between EN and SE in each cycle to launch the attack. This
is followed by asserting all the input signals to logical ‘1’s
and recording the power profile. The recorded power during
the second cycle (i.e., the OR function) is matched with
the power-profile reading from the models developed using
multiple test chips/simulations. This step allows the adversary
to determine the number of SOP minterms processed in the
2nd cycle (OR function input literals). By setting all the input
literals to logical ‘1’, the adversary ensures that each SOP
minterm in the function also equals a logical ‘1’. The BLs
in the DCIM OR array are pre-discharged to ‘0’. Thus, by
applying logical ‘1’ to all SOP minterms, SCARE ensures
that the BLs are charged as fast as possible (leading to the
highest possible power consumption).
Once the number of SOP minterms is determined, the
adversary analyzes the power profile of the 1st cycle to
determine the number of input literals in each minterm. Each
of the AND array input literals are set to logical ‘0’ to ensure
that each SOP minterm equals to ‘0’. By applying ‘0’ to
each minterm, the adversary ensures that the BL, which is
pre-charged to VDD, discharges at the highest possible rate.
Finally, by analyzing the power profile of the operation, the
adversary determines the number of input literals for each
AND gate (Fig. 1). Note that the leakage power must be
subtracted to analyze the function-dependent power.
The above attack model works only with true inputs. If the
function consists of complementary inputs, the attack will fail
(a)
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(b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 4: (a) Analysis of OR gate current profile with various
fanins; (b) current difference with fanin of n and n+1 to find
the measurement window; (c) PDF, (d) CDF, (e) STD and, (f)
mean current of OR gates.
since adversary cannot confirm if all the minterms are ‘1’ by
forcing all inputs to ‘1’.
2) Simulation Results:
DCIM OR Array: The current profiles of the OR gate with
fanin ranging between 0 to 8 is shown in Fig. 4a (time offset
is chosen when EN signal is activated). It indicates that OR
gates with various fanins charge the BLs at different rates.
Since the observed resistance of each BL decreases with the
number of LRS inputs (more number of resistors in parallel),
current through the array increases with fanin. However, the
separation between current profiles of each gate decreases with
fanin. With time the current profiles of various fanin gates
become indistinguishable. The current profiles merge when
the BL is charged up to VDD−Vth,Diode. Therefore, selection
of measurement window is critical.
Shorter measurement windows increase the resolution for
distinguishing fanins of OR gates (the best measurement
window is shown in Fig. 4b). In the suggested measurement
window, the currents of ORN and ORN+1 gates differ by
at least 5 µA. This is evident from the Probability Density
Function (PDF) of the current profiles of OR gates (Fig. 4c).
It is seen that the PDF of OR7 and OR8 have a noticeable
overlap. If the recorded current profile (from SCA) falls
(a)
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(b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 5: (a) Analysis of AND gate current profile with various
fanins; (b) current difference with fanin of n and n+1 to find
the measurement window; (c) PDF, (d) CDF, (e) STD and, (f)
mean current of OR gates.
within this overlap, the adversary might need to consider
both possibilities. In such cases, the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) may be useful to predict the number of inputs
(Fig. 4d). Additional properties of the distribution such as the
mean and Standard Deviation (STD) may be used to accurately
determine the gate fanin. The STD of OR gates with different
fanins is presented in Fig. 4e. It is noted that the STD does
not follow a monotonically increasing or decreasing trend. In
contrast, the mean values (Fig. 4f) exhibit a monotonically
increasing trend with fanin. Thus, the adversary can leverage
the CDF, PDF and mean distributions of the OR gate current
profiles collected from the test chips/simulation to analyze the
current profile recorded by SCA.
DCIM AND Array: Simulation setup for the DCIM AND
arrays is similar to the OR array. However, the adversary
applies SCA to extract the current profiles by monitoring the
ground node. Additionally, the AND power is higher than
OR power. This can be attributed to the fact that similar sized
transistors act as input buffers. The NMOS transistors have
higher mobility compared to PMOS transistors and discharge
the BL faster.
The current profiles of the AND gate with fanin ranging
between 0 to 8 is shown in Fig. 5a. Fig. 5b suggests the
(a)
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Measurement 
Window
(b)
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(e) (f)
Fig. 6: (a) Analysis of AND gate current profile during pre-
charge phase; (b) current difference of AND gates with fanin
of n and n+1 to find the measurement window; (c) PDF, (d)
CDF, (e) STD, and (f) mean current of AND array’s BLs
currents.
best measurement window to maximize the difference between
power profiles of various fanins. The PDF and CDF of current
distribution are shown in Fig. 5c and Fig. 5d, respectively.
It can be noted that the current increases with fanin. Unlike
the OR array, both the STD and mean value graphs of the
AND array, as shown in Fig. 5e and Fig. 5f, respectively,
increase monotonically with fanin. Therefore, the PDF, CDF,
STD, and mean value distributions collected from the test
chips/simulations can be leveraged by the adversary to identify
the fanin of the gate from the recorded SCA current profile.
B. Attack Model 2
1) Leveraging the power drawn during pre-charge of AND
Array: Adversary can identify gate fanin by analyzing the
current drawn during the pre-charge (pre-discharge) phase of
AND (OR) array (Fig. 6a). The adversary forces all minterms
to ‘0’ by trying multiple patterns of inputs and analyzing OR
array current. If OR array current is in the range of leakage
current, adversary identifies that as all the minterms are ‘0’.
Every active BL (BLs which participate in the implemented
function) is discharged to VDD−Vth,Diode if adversary forces
all minterms to ‘0’. This will lead to the maximum current
drawn during AND array pre-charge phase. In the next pre-
charge phase of AND operation cycle, DCIM has to charge
all active BLs up to VDD and based on the capacitor energy
(E = 12CV
2) adversary can find C which is the addition of all
active BLs capacitance. The adversary will know the capaci-
tance value on each BL by modeling BLs using accurate tools.
Subsequently, adversary can find the number of minterms by
the analysis proposed in Section III-A.
To find the pre-charge phase in the extracted power profile,
adversary will examine a large peak without a short circuit.
All large current peaks range from very large positive values
to negative values due to switching of CMOS gates which
consume short circuit (when both pull-up and pull-down
networks are on). However, pre-charge circuit only includes
PMOS transistors that only leads to negative current values
for AND array and positive current values for OR array.
This attack model works for all the functions (with true and
complementary inputs) implemented by DCIM.
2) Simulation Results: The simulation setup for DCIM
attack model 2 is similar to DCIM attack model 1. However,
the adversary examines the power signature during the pre-
charge phase instead of the computation window. The AND
array’s BLs are charged during the pre-charge phase. The
power profiles observed differ based on the number of BLs.
The adversary uses the distinct power measured during the pre-
charge phase to determine the number BLs, which represents
the number of minterms. The current profiles during the pre-
charge phase of AND gates with different fanins ranging from
0 to 8 are shown in Fig. 6a. Fig. 6b suggests the best mea-
surement window to maximize the difference between these
current profiles. Additionally, the PDF and CDF distributions
of pre-charge currents are shown in Fig. 6c and Fig. 6d,
respectively.
Note that the pre-charge current observed increases with
fanin. Both the STD and mean value graphs of the AND array,
as shown in Fig. 6e and (Fig. 6f, respectively, increase mono-
tonically with fanin. Therefore, the PDF, CDF, STD, and mean
value distributions collected from the test chips/simulations
can be leveraged by the adversary to identify the fanin of the
gate from the recorded SCA current profile.
C. Analysis of the Impact of Supply Voltage Magnitude on
SCARE Performance
We have also swept the magnitude of supply voltage to
analyze its impact on the performance of SCARE. For DCIM,
we swept VDD from 0.75V to 2V in 50mV increments. The
result is summarized in Fig. 7a. It is evident that mean value
of current of the gates with different fanins increases at higher
voltages. The differences in the mean values of currents are
increased (higher slope) at higher voltages too, which helps
the adversary to distinguish more accurately between different
fanins. Sigma analysis of current profiles show that current
distribution are wider at higher voltages and sharper at lower
voltages, which means sigma increases with voltage (Fig.
7b). As it is shown in Fig. 7c, CDF slope is decreasing at
higher voltages, which shows that sigma increases at higher
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 7: Analysis of current mean value, STD deviations,
percentage of distribution overlaps in PDF, and AND8 CDF
under different voltage nodes. (a) Mean Values, (b) STD
Deviations, (c) Percentage of overlaps, and (d) CDF of AND8.
voltages. Note that, under process variation, cases which
overlap into adjacent fanins’ distribution are important and
hard to distinguish. SCARE has calculated overlaps between
gates with fanins n and n + 1 (Fig. 7d), to have an insight
on the overlap percentage at various different voltage nodes.
Fig. 7d shows that for voltages near the nominal VDD the
overlap is at its lowest and it increases when the supply voltage
magnitude increases or decreases. The worst case is for very
low supply voltages, when the current magnitude is very small
and a small variation in the resistance values of RRAMs can
lead to ambiguity of the gates’ fanins.
IV. ATTACK ON MAGIC ARCHITECTURE
An adversary can distinguish between the power drawn by
the OR and AND array of MAGIC by examining the operation
time determined using the spike in the power signature that is
created during operation. The order of magnitude of difference
between OR and AND operation times ranges from 10X to
100X (as seen in Fig. 8).
A. Attack Model 1
1) Leveraging the power signature/operation time of OR
and AND arrays: Unlike DCIM, MAGIC’s computation time
depends on the type of gate and the fanin. An adversary can
RE the MAGIC functions using the computation time extracted
from the power profile.
MAGIC writes the result of a computation into a designated
output RRAM by altering its resistance (HRS → ‘0’ and
LRS → ‘1’). We observe a significant change in the power
profile when the resistance of the output RRAM changes. This
sharp change in the power profile (during writing the output
to RRAM) signifies the end of one MAGIC operation (e.g.
3-input AND operation). Note that the adversary is capable
of finding the computation times for different gates and inputs
by implementing known functions in MAGIC test chips and/or
simulations and recording their power profiles.
Alternatively, the adversary can observe the constant current
passing through output RRAM. In this approach, each of the
input literals is set to a logical ‘0’ (MAGIC initializes all the
input RRAMs to HRS, the output RRAMs of OR and AND
gates to HRS, and the output RRAMs of NOR gate to LRS).
By measuring the VDD current (minus the leakage current),
the adversary can determine the current passing through the
output RRAM. This allows the adversary to determine the
gate implemented in a particular clock cycle (e.g. differentiate
between the AND, NOR and OR gates). The observed
constant current (I) and the fanin value (n) can be attributed
to each gate (AND, OR, and NOR) based on the following
rules (considering a 8 input system):
NOR:
Vwrite
RLRS +
RLRS
Maxin
≥ I ≥ Vwrite
0.5RHRS
, n =
RHRS × I
Vwrite
OR:
Vwrite
RHRS
≥ I ≥ V write
1.5RHRS
,
n
n+ 1
=
RHRS × I
Vwrite
AND:
Vwrite
RHRS
≥ I ≥ Vwrite
(Maxin + 1)RHRS
, n =
Vwrite
RHRS × I − 1
Note that due to the process variations, n might not be
an integer and should be used to approximate to the nearest
positive whole number (since fanin should be integer). The
proposed attack model works only with true inputs. If the
function consists of complementary inputs, the attack will fail
since adversary cannot confirm if all the minterms are ‘1’ by
forcing all inputs to ‘1’.
2) Simulation Results: To evaluate the above-mentioned
attack model for MAGIC gates, IMC computations are per-
formed for AND, OR, and NOR gates. Note that MAGIC
simulations for NAND are not performed since it requires
each of the input RRAMs to be initialized to HRS. Therefore,
the output RRAM does not get enough voltage headroom
to get written since the input RRAMs (in HRS) consume a
high voltage across them. Further study is required to ensure
the validity of the MAGIC NAND design. For each of the
remaining gates, an increasing (AND gate) or decreasing
(OR and NOR gates) trend of computation time is observed
when the fanin of the logic array increases from 2 to 8. The
computation completion is determined by a sharp change in
the current profile during the switching of the output RRAM.
i) MAGIC AND Array: The distribution of AND oper-
ation times for fanin ranging from 2 to 8 is shown in (Fig.
8a. The computation times for each of the cases is represented
by a distinct distribution. Furthermore, the mean and STD of
each of the distributions (Fig. 8b and 8c, respectively), show
a monotonically increasing trend as the fanin increases. Each
of these graphs can be used to accurately determine the fanin
of the AND gates.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(f) (g) (h) (i)
Fig. 8: Analysis of current profiles with different MAGIC fanins under process variation to obtain CDF distribution of operation
times, mean operation times, and STD of operation times for NOR gates ((a),(b), and (c)), OR gates ((d),(e), and (f)), and
AND gates ((g), (h), and (i)), respectively.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9: Simulation results showing (a) write current distribution; (b) average write current; and (c) STD of the distribution for
switching 1 to 9 RRAM cells (8 input + 1 output) from ‘0’ to ‘1’.
ii) MAGIC OR Array: The distribution of OR operation
times for fanin ranging from 2 to 8 is shown in Fig. 8d.
Unlike MAGIC AND, we find that the computation time
distribution for each of the fanin overlaps. Therefore, the PDF
alone cannot be reliably used by an adversary to determine
the OR gate fanin. It is seen that the mean and STD of
each of the distributions (Fig. 8e and 8f, respectively), show
a decreasing trend with the fanin. We note that the MAGIC
OR implementation is comparatively resilient against SCA
compared to AND and NOR. But an adversary can still
leverage the SCA data to predict the structure of the OR gate
and the fanin value with reasonable accuracy.
iii) MAGIC NOR Array: The distribution of computation
times for the NOR operation with fanin ranging from 2 to
8 is shown in Fig. 8g. Similar to AND, the completion
times for each of the cases is represented by distinct CDFs.
Furthermore, the mean and STD of each of the distributions
(Fig. 8h and 8i, respectively), show a distinctly decreasing
trend with increase in fanin. Each of these graphs can be
reliably used to accurately determine the fanin of NOR gate.
B. Attack Model 2
1) Leveraging pre-compute RRAM write operation times
of AND or OR arrays: Since inputs are stored as resistance
values in RRAMs, their write operations are asymmetric and
the adversary can find the values which are stored in the
RRAMs by examining the power profile. The adversary can
force each of the inputs to logical ‘1’ (LRS) and examine the
RRAM write currents. Based on the write-current observed the
adversary can determine the number of RRAM cells switched
to ‘0’ (HRS) and the number of cells that remain at ‘1’
(HRS). IMC of any function through MAGIC occurs only
after the RRAM cells corresponding to inputs and output are
initialized to HRS or LRS values depending on the function
and the array operation (i.e. NOR, OR, etc). Assuming a
representative example function with 8 input literals, the
MAGIC architecture will employ 8 input RRAMs and 1 output
RRAM. Furthermore, each of these are preset to ‘0’ (HRS)
state. To execute a particular function, some or all of these
9 RRAMs resistances are switched to ‘1’ (LRS state). Note
that the power consumed for switching different number of
RRAMs (0 to 9 in this case) is distinct and can be extracted
(a) (b)
Fig. 10: Analysis of redundant inputs as countermeasure. (a)
PDF and (b) CDF power profile of AND2 with two redundant
inputs and AND3 without any redundant inputs. There is an
overlap between them which obfuscate the power profile.
through SCA.
In addition to the case-by-case method explained here, the
adversary can determine the number of HRS RRAMs (n) by
using the following equations (similar to equations mentioned
in Section IV-A):
NOR:
Vwrite
RLRS +
RLRS
Maxin
≥ I ≥ Vwrite
0.5RHRS
, n =
RHRS × I
Vwrite
OR:
Vwrite
RHRS
≥ I ≥ V write
1.5RHRS
,
n
n+ 1
=
RHRS × I
Vwrite
AND:
Vwrite
RHRS
≥ I ≥ Vwrite
(Maxin + 1)RHRS
, n =
Vwrite
RHRS × I − 1
2) Simulation Results: Simulation setup for the attack
model 2 on MAGIC is similar to the one in model 1, but
with an added step (looking during RRAM initialization). This
added step reveals the complementary inputs.
A 100-point Monte Carlo analysis is performed on RRAM
write current with the setting shown in Table II. The resulting
current distribution, average current, and STD of the distri-
bution are shown in Fig. 9a 9b and 9c, respectively. It is
evident that the number of RRAMs initialized to ‘1’ and
‘0’ can be found. In order to determine the inputs whose
complementary values are used, each input is flipped from
its original value (‘1’) one at a time. If a change in an input
value (1→ 0) leads to an increase in the number of ‘0’s (HRS
RRAMs), determined by re-examining the power signature,
we can deduce that the original value of the input is used in
the function. Alternatively, if the number of ‘0’s decreases, the
input’s complementary value is used in the function. In this
way, adversary can extract the structure of function with true
and complementary inputs.
C. Analysis of the Impact of Supply Voltage Magnitude on
SCARE Performance
In case of MAGIC, the VDD value is swept from 2.2V to
3V in 100mV increments. As shown in Fig. 11a and 11b, the
mean operation times decreases as the VDD value increases.
Furthermore, it is also seen that the standard deviation value
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 11: Analysis of operation time mean values, STD de-
viations, and OR CDF under different voltage nodes. (a),(b)
Mean Values, and (c),(d) STD Deviations of OR8.
Fig. 12: CDF of the operation times of MAGIC OR8 with
increasing voltage.
decreases under all VDDs as the the fanin value increases.
Fig. 11c and 11d show that the standard deviation of the
operation also decreases with increase in VDD and shows a
mostly negative trend with the change in fanin. Fig. 12 shows
that the slope increases as the VDD value increases and shows
a decrease in sigma value. The slope of VDD > 2.6V is
extremely high and is therefore not shown in Fig. 12 since
they overlap with the CDF at VDD = 2.6V .
V. COUNTERMEASURES
We propose the following countermeasures in order to
protect IMC architectures against SCARE.
A. Redundant Inputs
DCIM: Few redundant LRS RRAMs on each BL can be
implemented which are biased with a fixed voltage.
For instance, function a + bc can be implemented as:
a.1.1.1.1 + b.c.1.1.1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0. In this method
area increases and the overhead is based on the number of
maximum redundant inputs and number of inputs (e.g. four
redundant inputs for a function with eight inputs increases the
area by 0.25%). As long as the number of redundant LRS
RRAMs in each BL is less than 8, the SM stays relatively
constant. Based on our simulations, eight redundant inputs
are enough to mask an array with 64 inputs, which increases
the area by 6%. The number of LRS RRAMs on each BL
can be randomly distributed to further obfuscate the structure
of the implemented function. Power overhead is completely
dependant on the number of redundant inputs in each BL.
An example of masking AND2 with two redundant inputs
is shown in Fig. 10. It can be noted that the AND2 power
profile with two redundant inputs completely overlaps with
AND3 power profile with no redundant inputs. Therefore,
power profile signature gets obfuscated. In this example, the
power overhead is 21%.
Since the selector diode turns off when the voltage across
its two terminals is less than Vth, the AND (OR) array’s
redundant inputs should not be driven by VDD (‘0’) instead
they should be driven by VDD3 for AND array and
2VDD
3 for
OR array for better obfuscation.
MAGIC: In the case of MAGIC, redundant inputs increases
the fanin, and thus increases the number of input RRAM
bitcells. As previously shown in Section IV, increasing the
number of inputs even by ‘1’ literal has a distinguishable
change in the operation completion time. This change as
depicted in Fig. 8, can be leveraged to mask the true structure
of any MAGIC implementation for any of the operations.
B. Minterms with expanded literals
DCIM: Each minterm in a function can be implemented
by the maximum number of inputs. In this scenario, all
minterms show the same power profile and SCA alone fails.
However, an adversary can still try all the possible input
patterns and generate input-output pairs. Next, that can be used
to determine the function by using a Karnaugh map to reveal
the simplified Boolean expression.
For example, a+bc can be implemented in a 4 input system
as, abcd+abcd+abcd+abcd+abcd+abcd+abcd+abcd+
abcd+ abcd. Furthermore, it will become complicated for the
adversary to find the function when a+ bc and ab+ac+ad+
bd + cd have the same number of minterms in the expanded
version and when a+ bc has more minterms than abc+abc+
abc. This technique can protect the IP at the cost of increased
area and power overhead. An example of masking the function
by using this technique is shown in Fig. 13, which the two
functions consume the same power. Power and area overhead
depends on the implemented function and for the example in
Fig. 13 power consumption increases by 36% and AND array
area stays the same (since crossbar array is already there and
it has enough BLs to implement the minterms). However, OR
array’s area increases by 50% (number of WLs is changed).
MAGIC: Similarly for MAGIC, we consider two represen-
tative example functions a+ bc and abd+abd+abd. The first
function requires a 2-fanin AND and a 2-fanin OR operation,
while the second function requires three 3-fanin ANDs and
one 3-fanin OR operation. Expanding these functions into
(a)
(b)
Fig. 13: Analysis of expanding the literals as countermeasure.
Power profile of (a) AND during pre-charge and (b) OR during
computation for computing a + bc and the expanded version
of it. They overlap completely with each other.
(a) (b)
Fig. 14: Simulation results that show masking of original
function structure using maximized SOP form for 2 functions
(a) 2, 3, and 4-fanin MAGIC AND current profiles; (b) 2, 3,
and 6-fanin MAGIC OR current profiles.
their maximized SOP form will require six 6-fanin ANDs
and one 6-fanin OR operation for both of the functions.
Since these operations are identical, SCA delivers the same
result and masks the true structure of the operation. Fig. 14a
shows that 2-fanin and 3-fanin ANDs have distinctly different
operation completion time as depicted by a sharp change in
their current profiles. The 4-fanin AND for both operation in
their maximized SOP form is shown to be identical. Similarly,
Fig. 14b shows the distinctly different 2-fanin and 3-fanin
current profiles of each function’s OR operation and depicts
the identical 6-fanin OR current profiles for their maximized
form. This attack model will not incur any area overhead since
the maximized SOP form will only leverage previously present
RRAM cells in the crossbar array for any additional literals.
But, it will incur some power overhead due to the increase in
the number of SOP minterms to be computed.
The above-mentioned countermeasures increase the RE ef-
fort. For example, ab+cde+fgh without any countermeasures
would require 84 combinations of inputs to determine the func-
tion structure. Implementing the countermeasures increases the
required number of combinations to 256 (RE effort increases
by 3.04X). This increased effort enhances the resiliency of
the IMC architectures against SCARE. RE effort increases
exponentially with the number of inputs.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
A. Extracting the Exact Function
For MAGIC, in the absence of parallelism, the adversary
can find the number of input literals for each minterm and test
possible patterns to determine the exact minterm that correlates
to a particular function. The adversary can repeat this approach
to find all minterms one by one. For DCIM, the adversary
can determine the number of input literals per minterm after
calculating the number of minterms. Finally, by examining the
output, the adversary can try multiple patterns to determine the
exact correlating minterms.
B. Extracting Multiple Functions
For DCIM, the total number of functions implemented can
be determined by the number of outputs generated. For each
of these functions, the number of minterms per function and
the number of input literals per minterm can be extracted by
following the method described in this paper. The adversary
then proceeds to manipulate the input values to determine the
correlation of each minterm with each function output. Since
MAGIC does not support parallelism, adversary can easily
determine the number of input literals per minterm and try
various patterns to correlate each minterm with each function.
C. Number of Test Chips Needed for an Attack
We performed 1000-point Monte-Carlo simulations to de-
velop SCAREs power models for DCIM/MAGIC. In absence
of models, adversary can fabricate few chips to launch the
attack with minor loss in accuracy. The mean value of worst
case margin (e.g.,margin between AND7/AND8 for DCIM
and OR7/OR8 for MAGIC) is degraded by 3.5%, 3.2%, 1.8%
(for DCIM) and 5.2%, 4.77%, and 2.8% (for MAGIC) for
25, 50 and 100 chips, respectively compared to 1000-point
Monte-Carlo. Furthermore, standard deviation increases by
18.5%, 15.9%, and 4.9% for DCIM and 21.3%, 9%, and 7.9%
for MAGIC. Adversary can minimize measurement noise by
taking multiple samples and averaging them. This approach
is possible for IoT/mobile applications where adversary has
physical possession.
D. Realistic Attack & Parallelism
IMC architectures include MAGIC, DCIM and matrix-
vector multipliers (MVM) [24]. DCIM and MAGIC can im-
plement arbitrary functions while MVM can only implement
dot product.
Under parallel operations/functions, adversary can find the
number of functions by observing the number of outputs in
DCIM/MAGIC. In DCIM, number of outputs = number of
NOR gates. Power in second-cycle yields NOR gate fanins
(e.g., two OR2, one OR3). Power in cycle-1 yields number
of AND gates/fanins. After determining the total number of
AND/OR gates, adversary can run a limited number of input
patterns to relate the input bits to the corresponding observed
output bit. Compared to brute-force, SCARE reduces number
of test patterns to RE functionality e.g., 62.5% less patterns
to identify ab+ cd.
In MAGIC, designers need multiple arrays to implement
functions in parallel. Power peaks might overlap. The number
of functions can be found from the magnitude of power (e.g.,
for writing 1- vs 2-output RRAMs). While multiple array op-
erations can cause overlapping power spikes due to more than
one AND/OR, adversary can determine the individual gates by
dividing the total power as a summation of individual powers
as modeled before. Timing difference between completion of
gate operation can also be exploited.
E. SCARE on conventional memory
Although not covered in this paper, SCARE is also appli-
cable to SRAM based IMC such as, X-SRAM [10] since the
power timing profile of the read bitline during computation
depends on input patterns (e.g. read bitline discharges faster
for function AB if A = 1/B = 1 compared to A = 0/B = 1 or A
= 1/ B = 0). These studies are subject of our future research.
F. Hybrid Architectures
SCARE will experience noise from CMOS-logic for
mixture of IMC and CMOS-gates. MAGIC-based IMC
(pipelined/non-pipelined) involve high-power and long latency
write operations that can be distinguished from CMOS-logic
power. Furthermore, the CMOS-logic will compute after IMC
for non-pipelined implementations of DCIM/MAGIC and can
be separated in time. Pipelined implementations of DCIM will
combine CMOS and IMC powers and it could be difficult to
distinguish them. This could be a subject of future studies.
G. Prior Knowledge on the Implementation
Adversary can identify the sequence of gates without any
prior knowledge. Note, there are only two efficient methods
for function implementation in IMC namely, SOP or Product-
of-Sum (POS). For DCIM, adversary can distinguish between
SOP/POS by observing the polarity of current drawn during
pre-charge phase of each cycle e.g., negative (current drawn
from voltage supply) (positive (current drwan by the ground
node)) current for AND (OR) array. For MAGIC, adversary
can identity function (AND/OR/NOR) due to distinguishable
difference in latency of gate operation extracted from the
power profile. Therefore, functions do not need to be in AND-
OR formats.
If IMC-paradigm (i.e., MAGIC vs DCIM) is unknown,
adversary can identify IP by screening the power profiles
(PDCIM << PMAGIC). DCIMs output is sensed by a sense-
amplifier (low-power) while MAGICs output is written to an
output RRAM (high-power). Non-parallel implementation of
MAGIC uniquely exhibits multiple peaks in the power profile
compared to DCIM.
H. Applicability of Existing SCA Obfuscation Techniques
SCA obfuscation techniques such as [25] propose to inject
random code execution to scramble power profile and pre-
vent SCA on cryptographic implementations. Such protection
techniques, if extended to IMC architectures, will impose
significant throughput overhead since random functions be-
tween actual ones will incur extra delay. This is in addition
to area and power overheads. In [26], duplicating logics
with complementary operations are proposed to eliminate the
asymmetry between power drawn to process 0 and 1. This
technique will not protect IMC against SCA since the function
and its complement may have different number of minterms.
Therefore, they may consume different amount of power.
I. Hspice Modeling & Fabrication
Conventional random logic can include various gate flavors
(NAND/NOR/AOI/OAI/AND/OR/INV) which makes Hspice-
model (or experimental chip)-based attack challenging. How-
ever, IMC circuit is systematic and only includes NAND/NOR
gates due to SOP/POS implementation for simplicity. Fur-
thermore, IMC using emerging NVMs provide distinct and
high amplitude power signatures compared to CMOS gates.
Therefore, RE of functionality will be challenging in CMOS
even if adversary has accurate power-model of individual
gates. In SCARE, we assume (Section III-A2) that adversary
can fabricate few test-chips (costly) to characterize the power
signature of individual gates in IMC if a model is not available.
This is achievable by multiplexing power of multiple gates and
enabling them one at a time.
Adversary will extract power/timing model from his own
fabricated chips with test features to characterize individ-
ual gates although it will require high-precision equipment,
time (due to multiple measurements). Obtaining PDK from
vendor is considered easy (although NDA may be needed).
Power/timing analysis of victim chip will be more challenging.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes SCARE, a non-invasive RE on IMC
using SCA for the first time. SCARE is applied to two well-
known emerging technology based IMC architectures (DCIM
and MAGIC). The adversary extracts power/timing distri-
butions from well-calibrated simulations or IMC test chips
with known functions. Next, the functions are extracted by
matching the probed power and timing profiles with modeled
profiles for various gates and fanins. We also present possible
countermeasures to mitigate SCARE attack.
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